Physical Address
304 North Cardinal St.
Dorchester Center, MA 02124
Russia has signaled the most serious movement toward nuclear test planning since the Cold War’s end. On Saturday, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the Kremlin is working on President Vladimir Putin’s Nov. 5 order to prepare proposals for a possible Russian nuclear test, adding that the public would be informed of the results once ready. The remarks, carried by state news agency TASS, were echoed in wire reporting and follow a volatile week in U.S.–Russia relations.
Lavrov linked the step to President Donald Trump’s surprise announcement last week that the United States would resume nuclear weapons testing. Moscow says it has received no clarification from Washington on the scope of those tests. The U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has since said the administration’s directive does not currently involve nuclear explosions—pointing instead to non-critical experiments and system checks that stop short of a detonation. That clarification has not assuaged Russian concerns.
The Kremlin’s legal and political groundwork predates this week. In 2023, Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), arguing the move restored “parity” with the United States, which signed but never ratified the pact. Moscow has repeatedly said post-Soviet Russia has never conducted a nuclear test; the Soviet Union’s last was in 1990, while the United States last tested in 1992 before entering a unilateral moratorium.
Saturday’s statement lands amid a broader diplomatic free-fall. The White House has canceled a planned summit with Putin, leveled new sanctions on Russia, and publicly vented frustration over stalled efforts to end the war in Ukraine—all in the span of days. Against that backdrop, even a study of testing options will be read by allies and adversaries as part deterrence theater, part escalation signal.
What would a Russian test mean? Practically, a resumption of explosive testing by any nuclear-armed great power would be a historic break with a three-decade taboo (outside North Korea). Strategically, it would aim to message resolve and validate new warhead designs—particularly as Russia touts next-generation systems and watches Western aid flows to Kyiv. Diplomatically, it would likely splinter the residual consensus around test restraint, draw sharp censure from Europe and the CTBT Organization, and trigger mirror-messaging from Washington—even if the U.S. maintains that its own upcoming work remains non-explosive.
Still, Saturday’s wording matters: “proposals” do not equal a test, and Russia has previously used calibrated ambiguity to shape risk perceptions without crossing red lines. U.S. clarifications also matter: if Washington’s activity stays squarely in the realm of sub-critical experiments and simulations, it preserves a technical and political distinction Moscow itself has invoked for years. The Kremlin says it awaits further detail.
For now, the most important facts are historic ones. The world’s last U.S. nuclear detonation took place in 1992; Russia’s last was under the Soviet flag in 1990. The decades since have not erased the knowledge of how to test—but they have built a fragile norm against doing so. Today, both capitals are talking about tests. Whether either conducts one will help define the next era of nuclear restraint—or its unraveling.
